Gerhard Schröder: The Chancellor Who Bet on Moscow
Within weeks of leaving the German chancellery in 2005, Gerhard Schröder took a seat on the board of Nord Stream AG — the company created to carry Russian gas under the Baltic to Germany. Seventeen years later, after Russian tanks crossed into Ukraine, seventeen members of his own party applied to have him expelled from it. He survived that too. Few careers in modern European politics have combined so much achievement with so complete a collapse of reputation.
The Boy from Blomberg
Schröder was born on 7 April 1944 in Blomberg. His father, a Wehrmacht lance corporal, was killed in combat in Romania six months later; his mother supported the family as an agricultural labourer. It was genuine post-war poverty, and it remained the organising story of his political identity: the fatherless son of a farm worker who ended up running Germany.
The route was slow and entirely self-made. He completed retail apprenticeships, studied at evening classes, and passed the Abitur only in 1966, at twenty-two — an age at which the sons of the German professional classes were already halfway through university. He then read law at Göttingen from 1966 to 1971 and qualified as a lawyer in 1976. One of his early cases was securing early release from prison for Horst Mahler, a member of the Baader-Meinhof group: a piece of work that told you both about his politics at the time and about his appetite for cases nobody else wanted.
Juso, Hanover, Bonn
He had joined the Social Democratic Party in 1963, aged nineteen, and rose through it in the conventional way and then faster than the conventional way. In 1978 he became chairman of the Jusos, the party's youth organisation and its noisiest left flank. He entered the Bundestag in 1980, and in 1990 became Minister-President of Lower Saxony, the office he held for eight years.
Lower Saxony was the making of him as a governing politician rather than an agitator. It is the home of Volkswagen, and running it meant sitting across from industrialists and union leaders in the same week. By 1998 he had shed almost all of the Juso rhetoric and kept the instinct for the room.
The Chancellery
He won the 1998 federal election and governed in coalition with the Greens — an arrangement widely predicted to fall apart within a year. It lasted seven.
Twenty questions, eight minutes on the clock, and a percentile measured against everyone who has taken it. No sign-up.
Take the IQ test →The domestic record was quietly transformative. His government legislated same-sex civil partnerships, liberalised naturalisation law in a country that had defined citizenship by descent, and negotiated the phase-out of German nuclear power. Any one of those would have been a defining reform for a lesser chancellor; he passed all three in a coalition with a party of former protest movements.
Agenda 2010
His most consequential act was also the one that destroyed his political base. Agenda 2010 restructured the German labour market and welfare system, tightening the terms on which Germans could rely on the state. It was an assault on the settlement his own party had spent a century building, undertaken by a Social Democrat against the explicit wishes of much of his movement.
Economists have argued about it ever since, and German trade unionists have not stopped being angry about it. What is not in dispute is that it was a deliberate, costly and clear-eyed choice: Schröder concluded that Germany's postwar labour model could not survive contact with the following decades, and he broke his own coalition's core constituency to change it. He lost the 2005 election to Angela Merkel and left politics.
The German Way
Abroad his record was, until 2005, one of the more coherent of any modern German chancellor. He authorised German participation in NATO operations in Kosovo and then in Afghanistan — deployments that broke sharply with decades of postwar German restraint, and pushed through by a coalition containing a party founded on pacifism. He then refused to join the invasion of Iraq in 2003, campaigning explicitly on what he called "the German Way" as an alternative to what he characterised as American warmongering.
That combination — willing to fight when he judged the case sound, unwilling when he did not, and prepared to say so to Washington in public — was the high point of his standing at home and abroad.
Gazprom
Then came the second act that swallowed the first. After Nord Stream, Schröder took roles with Rosneft and Gazprom, becoming the most prominent Western politician on the Russian energy payroll and a personal friend of Vladimir Putin. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 the pressure became overwhelming; he left the Rosneft board in May 2022 and abandoned his plan to join Gazprom's, but he did not break with Putin, and he travelled to Moscow to see him in late July that year.
Seventeen SPD members applied to expel him from the party. On 8 August 2022 the party's arbitration committee in Hannover rejected the application, finding that he had not broken party rules and observing that "the area of personal friendships is part of the private life" — while acknowledging that his conduct had caused damage to the party. A further arbitration ruling in March 2023 confirmed the outcome. He remains a Social Democrat.
Why Gerhard Is Called a Genius
The case rests on one specific and rare capacity: Schröder could see, and act on, the political cost of a necessary decision before the cost arrived, and take it anyway. Agenda 2010 is the exhibit. Every incentive available to a Social Democratic chancellor pointed away from dismantling the welfare architecture of German social democracy; he did it in full knowledge that it would split his party, cost him office, and leave his name a curse in union halls for a generation. Whether one thinks the reform was right, that is not the behaviour of an ordinary politician. The same quality appears in the deployment decisions — sending German soldiers into combat while governing with the Greens — and in his refusal on Iraq, taken against a US administration at the height of its power.
He also had a street-level political talent that his rivals never matched: a working-class self-presentation, wholly authentic in origin, deployed with complete professionalism. He climbed from an Abitur at twenty-two to the chancellery without patrons.
The counter-case is severe and mostly concerns judgement after 2005. A chancellor who joins the board of a foreign state's energy vehicle weeks after leaving office, and stays loyal to that state's leader through an invasion, has made an error that no amount of earlier skill offsets — and it was foreseeable. His own party's arbitration body cleared him on the narrow question of rules while stating plainly that he had damaged it. "Genius" is too generous, and it is the wrong category anyway: Schröder's gift was nerve, not intellect. He had extraordinary courage about domestic reform and remarkably poor judgement about who to be indebted to.
Legacy
Schröder has been married five times — four earlier marriages earned him the German nickname "Audi Man," after the four rings — most recently to the South Korean economist Kim So-yeon in 2018; he is a serious art collector and a Protestant. His reforms outlived his reputation: Agenda 2010 shaped the German economy for two decades, the citizenship law changed who counts as German, and the nuclear phase-out he negotiated eventually happened. And the last chapter is his too: the most successful reformer German social democracy produced in fifty years ended as the party's most embarrassing member, cleared by its own tribunal and welcome nowhere else in it.
Achievements
- Minister-President of Lower Saxony (1990–1998)
- Federal Chancellor of Germany (1998–2005)
- member of the German Bundestag (1980–1983)
- President of the Bundesrat of Germany (1997–1998)
- Grand Order of Queen Jelena
- Grand Cross of the Order of the Star of Romania
- Order of the Cross of Terra Mariana, 1st Class
- Educated at University of Göttingen


